《通脹削減法案》和支柱二如何塑造歐盟競爭力的未來中英文對照

編譯：思邁特財稅國際稅收服務團隊

French President Macron is coming to Washington, D.C., this week to ask President Biden the question on the minds of European leaders: “Why did you do this to us?”

法國總統(tǒng)馬克龍本周將來到華盛頓特區(qū)，向拜登總統(tǒng)詢問歐盟領導人心中的問題?！澳銥槭裁匆@樣對我們”？

When President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, he put many European companies at a disadvantage unless they move production to the United States because of the law’s renewable energy tax credits for American-produced goods. President Macron will attempt to negotiate European companies’ access to these credits.

當拜登總統(tǒng)簽署《通脹削減法案》成為法律時，它使許多歐盟公司處于不利地位，除非它們將生產(chǎn)轉移到美國，因為該法案對美國生產(chǎn)的商品有可再生能源稅收抵免。馬克龍總統(tǒng)將試圖就歐盟公司獲得這些抵免進行談判。

President Macron and prominent EU leaders have voiced their displeasure with the domestic requirements and have debated retaliatory trade restrictions. Not only is their ally putting European companies at a disadvantage during a war and high inflation, but at a macro level, European leaders fear an industrial exodus from the EU to the United States because of the war, protectionist credits, and higher European energy prices. EU officials have called the American credits an “existential challenge” to Europe’s economy.

馬克龍總統(tǒng)和歐盟著名領導人已經(jīng)表達了他們對國內要求的不滿，并就報復性貿(mào)易限制進行了討論。不僅他們的盟友在戰(zhàn)爭和高通脹期間使歐盟公司處于不利地位，而且在宏觀層面上，歐盟領導人擔心由于戰(zhàn)爭、保護主義抵免和歐盟能源價格上漲，工業(yè)會從歐盟流向美國。歐盟官員稱美國的抵免是對歐盟經(jīng)濟的“生存挑戰(zhàn)”。

Unfortunately for the future of EU competitiveness, “why did you do this to us?” is the wrong question. European leaders should instead be asking themselves, “why is the EU so vulnerable to losing major industries, and is the EU prepared for future subsidy wars with other countries?”

不幸的是，對于歐盟未來的競爭力來說，“你們?yōu)槭裁匆@樣對我們”？這是一個錯誤的問題。歐盟領導人應該反過來問自己，“為什么歐盟如此容易失去主要產(chǎn)業(yè)，歐盟是否為未來與其他國家的補貼戰(zhàn)爭做好準備”？

Fear of Industrial Exodus

對工業(yè)外流的恐懼

At first glance, it is easy to blame Russia and high energy prices for making Europe less competitive. With the price of energy spiking all over Europe, producers are finding it harder to make a profit. With an extra tax incentive to move production to the U.S., some companies might be tempted to shift production out of the EU.

乍一看，很容易責怪俄羅斯和高能源價格使歐盟失去競爭力。隨著整個歐盟的能源價格飆升，生產(chǎn)商發(fā)現(xiàn)更難盈利。在將生產(chǎn)轉移到美國的額外稅收激勵下，一些公司可能會受到誘惑，將生產(chǎn)轉移到歐盟以外的地方。

However, these scapegoats are an example of recency bias and conveniently ignore two fundamental issues with EU competitiveness.

然而，這些代罪羔羊是近因效應的一個例子，并方便地忽略了歐盟競爭力的兩個基本問題。

The first is the simple fact that the five largest economies in the EU have less competitive corporate tax codes than the United States. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands all rank below the U.S. in corporate tax competitiveness based on Tax Foundation’s 2022 International Tax Competitiveness Index. This means that even without higher wartime energy prices and the recent protectionist tax credits, the United States still offers companies a friendlier business climate in which to invest. The uncompetitive European rankings are due in part to poorly designed tax policies such as digital services taxes, windfall profits taxes, poor treatment of capital investment, and other complexities.  

首先是一個簡單的事實，即歐盟5個最大經(jīng)濟體的公司稅法競爭力低于美國。根據(jù)稅收基金會的2022年國際稅收競爭力指數(shù)，德國、法國、意大利、西班牙和荷蘭的公司稅收競爭力排名都低于美國。這意味著，即使沒有更高的戰(zhàn)時能源價格和最近的保護主義稅收抵免，美國仍然為公司提供了一個更友好的投資商業(yè)環(huán)境。歐洲排名缺乏競爭力的部分原因是設計不當?shù)亩愂照撸鐢?shù)字服務稅、暴利稅、資本投資處理不當以及其他復雜問題。

The second is that European policymakers openly admit that fairness, rather than competitiveness and growth, is their primary objective when designing tax policy. Some have gone as far as to question why economic growth is necessary at all and have proposed alternative economic theories based on declining growth.

其次，歐盟的政策制定者公開承認，在設計稅收政策時，公平，而不是競爭力和增長，是他們的首要目標。有些人甚至質疑為什么經(jīng)濟增長是必要的，并提出了基于增長下降的替代經(jīng)濟理論。

However, when companies plan capital-intensive investments, they are looking to do so in economic environments likely to produce a return on their investment. Growth is an essential part of that calculation.

然而，當公司計劃資本密集型投資時，他們希望在可能產(chǎn)生投資回報的經(jīng)濟環(huán)境中進行投資。增長是這種計算的一個重要部分。

In addition, if the EU is considering any form of strategic autonomy, its ability to do so cannot hinge on laws passed by the U.S. Congress. This autonomy will require principled tax policy that supports growth and investment in the EU.   

此外，如果歐盟正在考慮任何形式的戰(zhàn)略自主權，那么其能力不能取決于美國國會通過的法律。這種自主性將需要有原則的稅收政策，支持歐盟的增長和投資。  

Therefore, higher energy prices and the protectionist tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act may serve as the final reasons companies decide to move production across the Atlantic. But it is rare for entire industries to leave almost overnight because of foreign tax credits. The type of industrial exodus that European leaders currently fear comes from fundamentally uncompetitive tax systems and policies that punish economic growth.

因此，更高的能源價格和《通脹削減法案》中的保護主義稅收抵免可能成為公司決定將生產(chǎn)轉移到大西洋彼岸的最終原因。但是，整個產(chǎn)業(yè)幾乎在一夜之間因為外國稅收抵免而離開的情況是很罕見的。歐盟領導人目前擔心的工業(yè)外流類型來自于根本上沒有競爭力的稅收制度和懲罰經(jīng)濟增長的政策。 

The European Response

歐盟的回應

Since August, European leaders have debated how to respond to the Inflation Reduction Act provisions specifically and to American protectionism more broadly. A new U.S.-EU task force was created to specifically discuss the problematic tax provisions in detail.  

自8月以來，歐盟領導人一直在辯論如何具體應對《通脹削減法案》的規(guī)定，以及更廣泛地應對美國的保護主義。一個新的美國-歐盟特別工作組已經(jīng)成立，專門詳細討論有問題的稅收規(guī)定。

President Macron represents the first option for the EU. If he can convince the Biden administration to grant the EU an exception to the domestic content requirements, it would alleviate the concerns of European producers. It is yet to be seen if President Biden has the political will or the legal authority to grant such an exception without a U.S.-EU trade deal in place before the Act takes effect on 1 January 2023.

馬克龍總統(tǒng)代表了歐盟的第一個選擇。如果他能說服拜登政府給予歐盟一個國內含量要求的例外，那么這將緩解歐盟生產(chǎn)商的擔憂。在該法案于2023年1月1日生效之前，如果沒有美歐貿(mào)易協(xié)定，那么拜登總統(tǒng)是否有政治意愿或法律權力給予這種例外，還有待觀察。

Another option could be to file a dispute at the World Trade Organization （WTO） and resume the tit-for-tat trade war started under the Trump administration that has recently been rebalanced under President Biden. However, in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine and the need for Western unity, this option seems unlikely. This is despite “$200 billion of the $367 billion total subsidies not being WTO compliant” according to Olivier Becht, French Minister for Foreign Trade and Attractiveness.

另一個選擇可能是向世界貿(mào)易組織 （WTO） 提出爭端，并恢復在特朗普政府領導下開始的針鋒相對的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，這種貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)最近在拜登總統(tǒng)領導下得到了重新平衡。然而，在俄烏戰(zhàn)爭和西方國家需要團結的背景下，這種選擇似乎不太可能。法國對外貿(mào)易和吸引力部長Olivier Becht稱，盡管“3670億美元的補貼總額中有2000億美元不符合世貿(mào)組織的規(guī)定”。

A third, and likely best option for the EU, would be to implement principled pro-growth tax policies that boost overall European competitiveness. Meaningful reform ideas include lowering corporate tax rates towards the OECD average and providing full expensing for capital investment. This is, unfortunately, the least likely outcome due to a lack of political will.  

第三，也可能是歐盟的最佳選擇，是實施有原則的有利于增長的稅收政策，提高歐盟整體競爭力。有意義的改革想法包括將公司稅率降低到OECD的平均水平，并為資本投資提供全額費用。不幸的是，由于缺乏政治意愿，這是最不可能的結果。

Finally, a fourth option floated by the French government is to replicate the Inflation Reduction Act with a “Buy European” subsidy regime of its own. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asked for a similar mechanism in her State of the Union speech in September called the European Sovereignty Fund. This is despite Commissioner Dombrovskis warning that “subsidy races tend to be expensive and inefficient” and Member States like the Netherlands and Sweden cautioning against subsidies for fear of trade retaliation from other trading partners.

最后，法國政府提出的第4個選擇是用自己的“購買歐盟”補貼制度來復制《通脹削減法案》。歐盟委員會主席Ursula von der Leyen在她9月份的國情咨文中要求建立一個類似的機制，稱為歐盟主權基金。盡管委員Dombrovskis警告說，“補貼競爭往往是昂貴和低效的”，而且荷蘭和瑞典等成員國因擔心其他貿(mào)易伙伴的貿(mào)易報復而告誡不要提供補貼。 

Pillar Two and Subsidy Competition  

支柱二和補貼競爭  

If the EU decides to implement a “Buy European” subsidy regime, there are two important aspects for policymakers to consider.

如果歐盟決定實施“購買歐盟”的補貼制度，那么政策制定者需要考慮兩個重要方面。

The first is how many financial resources will be needed to win a subsidy war, not only against the United States, but also against China which massively subsides state industries. There’s a question of whether the EU has the resources to win such a war, and even if it does, how the EU would raise such funds.

首先是需要多少財政資源來贏得一場補貼戰(zhàn)爭，不僅是針對美國，還有針對大規(guī)模補貼國有產(chǎn)業(yè)的中國。有一個問題是，歐盟是否有資源來贏得這樣一場戰(zhàn)爭，即使有，歐盟將如何籌集這些資金。

The second is the possible adoption of Pillar Two in the EU and its interaction with EU State aid rules. By setting a minimum 15 percent corporate tax rate, Pillar Two curtails some forms of tax competition. What this means in practice is that countries face less pressure to compete for investment by adjusting their tax rates and are incentivized to use other policy measures, such as subsidy regimes, instead. In other words, Pillar Two “solves” part of fiscal competition while creating another.

第二是歐盟可能采取的支柱二，以及它與歐盟國家援助規(guī)則的互動。通過設定最低15%的公司稅率，支柱二遏制了某些形式的稅收競爭。這在實踐中意味著，各國在通過調整稅率來競爭投資方面面臨的壓力較小，而被激勵使用其他政策措施，如補貼制度。換句話說，支柱二在“解決”部分財政競爭的同時，也制造了另一種競爭。

Unlike countries such as the United States or China, the EU has fairly strict State aid rules that prohibit unfair government subsidies for national industries. In a world where the EU has adopted Pillar Two, or at least in the five largest EU economies, policymakers will have to carefully design their subsidy regimes to remain compliant with EU rules knowing that their competitors do not face similar constraints.

與美國或中國等國家不同，歐盟有相當嚴格的國家援助規(guī)則，禁止政府對國家產(chǎn)業(yè)的不公平補貼。在歐盟采用支柱二的世界里，或者至少在歐盟5大經(jīng)濟體中，政策制定者將不得不仔細設計它們的補貼制度，以保持遵守歐盟的規(guī)則，知道他們的競爭對手不會面臨類似的約束。

One way the EU might combat this is a recently approved mechanism that allows the European Commission to identify foreign subsidies that distort the EU’s internal market and take redressive measures. However, this regulation has yet to come into effect and would likely not apply to subsidies that foreign countries use for products sent to non-EU markets.

歐盟可能打擊這種情況的一個方法是最近批準的一個機制，該機制允許歐盟委員會識別扭曲歐盟內部市場的外國補貼，并采取補救措施。然而，這項規(guī)定尚未生效，可能不適用于外國向非歐盟市場產(chǎn)品使用的補貼。

Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic should value the benefits of principled pro-growth tax policy and rules-based free trade. The U.S. and EU need to find common ground in wartime to boost investment in renewable energy sources and break away from Russian energy reliance. Principled, pro-growth tax policy, not protectionist subsidy wars, should lead the way.

大西洋兩岸的政策制定者應該重視有原則的促進增長的稅收政策和基于規(guī)則的自由貿(mào)易的好處。美國和歐盟需要在戰(zhàn)時找到共同點，促進對可再生能源的投資，擺脫對俄羅斯能源的依賴。有原則的有利于增長的稅收政策，而不是保護主義的補貼戰(zhàn)爭，應該引領潮流。

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