應(yīng)“雙支柱”方案要求，多國(guó)已經(jīng)承諾在支柱一生效后將取消征收數(shù)字服務(wù)稅以及其他相關(guān)類(lèi)似單邊措施

收集整理：思邁特財(cái)稅國(guó)際稅收服務(wù)團(tuán)隊(duì)

日期：2021年12月7日

TPGUIDER按：隨著全球商業(yè)環(huán)境的巨大變化，傳統(tǒng)的稅收管理在當(dāng)今時(shí)代已體現(xiàn)出諸多不適應(yīng)，如互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的興起為納稅人（主要為美國(guó)跨國(guó)科技公司）選擇納稅地點(diǎn)擴(kuò)大了自由度，使得數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)的市場(chǎng)國(guó)分享的利潤(rùn)極其有限，進(jìn)而讓各國(guó)的稅收收入兩極分化。對(duì)此，2018年3月歐盟委員會(huì)就數(shù)字化業(yè)務(wù)活動(dòng)征稅的新方式立法提案，并提出征收數(shù)字服務(wù)稅（DST）的反避稅手段。

然而對(duì)于征收數(shù)字服務(wù)稅的反避稅手段，僅在歐盟內(nèi)部就有著兩派對(duì)立的態(tài)度，以愛(ài)爾蘭、荷蘭及盧森堡為反對(duì)代表的一方，因跨國(guó)科技公司在其內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的高額利潤(rùn)而受益；而以英國(guó)、法國(guó)及西班牙為支持代表的另一方，出于自身利益的考慮，對(duì)數(shù)字服務(wù)稅實(shí)行單邊稅收措施。對(duì)于征收單邊數(shù)字服務(wù)稅的舉措，美國(guó)貿(mào)易代表辦公室認(rèn)定該舉措對(duì)美國(guó)公司具有“歧視性”，違背了現(xiàn)行國(guó)際稅收基本原則，并對(duì)部分征收數(shù)字服務(wù)稅的國(guó)家進(jìn)行了關(guān)稅反制。

由于多方在數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)的稅收問(wèn)題上難以統(tǒng)一意見(jiàn)，故OECD受G20委托，旨在就數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)稅收問(wèn)題達(dá)成多邊解決方案。2019年2月，OECD在《應(yīng)對(duì)數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)的稅收挑戰(zhàn)的政策說(shuō)明文檔》中，首次提出“雙支柱”解決方案；2021年7月，OECD發(fā)布聲明，130個(gè)國(guó)家（地區(qū)）支持“雙支柱”解決方案；2021年10月8日，OECD再次發(fā)布聲明，在7月共識(shí)的基礎(chǔ)上，BEPS包容性框架下140個(gè)成員中的136個(gè)國(guó)家（地區(qū)）就“雙支柱”解決方案達(dá)成共識(shí)，要求所有締約方撤銷(xiāo)對(duì)所有企業(yè)的所有數(shù)字服務(wù)稅以及其他相關(guān)類(lèi)似單邊措施，并承諾未來(lái)不再引入類(lèi)似措施。聲明還要求，自2021年10月8日起，至2023年12月31日和多邊公約生效日中較早一日，各轄區(qū)不得對(duì)任何企業(yè)實(shí)施新立法的數(shù)字服務(wù)稅或者其他相關(guān)類(lèi)似單邊措施。將妥善協(xié)調(diào)撤銷(xiāo)現(xiàn)行數(shù)字服務(wù)稅以及其他相關(guān)類(lèi)似措施的方式。

需要注意的是：上述數(shù)字服務(wù)稅只是一種狹義概念，特指上述歐盟等國(guó)家采取的臨時(shí)性征收數(shù)字服務(wù)稅。而廣義上的數(shù)字服務(wù)稅，還包括對(duì)數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)本身征收的增值稅等流轉(zhuǎn)稅稅種，這些并不在上述聲明撤銷(xiāo)之列。為了適用數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代，傳統(tǒng)稅制也會(huì)有相應(yīng)變革，以更好對(duì)數(shù)字服務(wù)征稅。

為推動(dòng)的本輪國(guó)際稅改協(xié)議生效實(shí)施，解決數(shù)字服務(wù)稅的爭(zhēng)端，美國(guó)與歐洲各國(guó)積極參與談判，并就數(shù)字服務(wù)稅的爭(zhēng)端達(dá)成妥協(xié)，詳見(jiàn)以下NEWS。據(jù)不完全統(tǒng)計(jì)，各國(guó)就未來(lái)是否征收數(shù)字服務(wù)稅與美方談判或公開(kāi)表態(tài)的情況如下表：

注：根據(jù)公開(kāi)資料匯總整理；截至目前，BEPS包容性框架下141個(gè)成員中的137個(gè)國(guó)家（地區(qū)）就“雙支柱”解決方案達(dá)成共識(shí)；包容性框架轄區(qū)中肯尼亞、尼日利亞、巴基斯坦和斯里蘭卡尚未同意相關(guān)方案提議。

新聞1.美國(guó)與歐洲五國(guó)就數(shù)字稅爭(zhēng)端達(dá)成妥協(xié)

新聞來(lái)源：新華社

時(shí)間：2021年10月21日

新華社華盛頓10月21日電 國(guó)與奧地利、法國(guó)、意大利、西班牙、英國(guó)21日宣布就數(shù)字服務(wù)稅爭(zhēng)端達(dá)成妥協(xié)，在經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織推動(dòng)的國(guó)際稅改協(xié)議生效后，歐洲五國(guó)將取消征收數(shù)字服務(wù)稅，美國(guó)將放棄對(duì)這五國(guó)的報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅措施。

美國(guó)與上述歐洲五國(guó)當(dāng)天發(fā)表聯(lián)合聲明稱(chēng)，全球130多個(gè)國(guó)家和司法管轄區(qū)已于10月8日就經(jīng)合組織推動(dòng)的雙支柱國(guó)際稅改方案達(dá)成協(xié)議，以應(yīng)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)數(shù)字化帶來(lái)的稅收挑戰(zhàn)。從一開(kāi)始，這一國(guó)際稅改談判的關(guān)鍵推動(dòng)力就是要用重新分配跨國(guó)企業(yè)征稅權(quán)的共識(shí)方案（即支柱一方案）取代單邊數(shù)字服務(wù)稅和其他類(lèi)似措施。

為此，奧、法、意、西、英五國(guó)同意在2023年經(jīng)合組織支柱一方案生效后，取消征收數(shù)字服務(wù)稅。從2022年1月到支柱一方案生效前的過(guò)渡期內(nèi)，如果企業(yè)在這五國(guó)繳納的數(shù)字稅金額超過(guò)支柱一方案新規(guī)則生效后應(yīng)繳的稅金，其未來(lái)在這五國(guó)的稅收可用超出部分抵扣。作為交換，美國(guó)將放棄針對(duì)這五國(guó)數(shù)字稅出臺(tái)的但尚未實(shí)施的關(guān)稅報(bào)復(fù)措施。

經(jīng)合組織的支柱一方案要求大型跨國(guó)公司在其經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)所在國(guó)也需納稅，以確保規(guī)模最大、利潤(rùn)最豐厚的跨國(guó)企業(yè)利潤(rùn)和征稅權(quán)在各國(guó)之間更公平地分配。這很大程度上是要解決美歐持續(xù)數(shù)年的數(shù)字服務(wù)稅之爭(zhēng)。近年來(lái)，法國(guó)等歐洲國(guó)家積極推動(dòng)針對(duì)谷歌、亞馬遜、蘋(píng)果等大型科技企業(yè)在本國(guó)的經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)征收數(shù)字稅，遭到美國(guó)強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)。美國(guó)隨后對(duì)多個(gè)貿(mào)易伙伴的數(shù)字服務(wù)稅發(fā)起“301調(diào)查”，但美方最后決定暫緩落實(shí)相關(guān)報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅措施，以便推進(jìn)多邊渠道的國(guó)際稅改談判。

據(jù)悉，支柱一方案實(shí)施后，來(lái)自全球約100家大型跨國(guó)公司的超過(guò)1250億美元利潤(rùn)將被重新分配給各國(guó)，其中大部分利潤(rùn)來(lái)自美國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)科技企業(yè)。

據(jù)美國(guó)媒體報(bào)道，美國(guó)與歐洲五國(guó)的聯(lián)合聲明文本顯示，如果到2023年12月31日經(jīng)合組織推動(dòng)的國(guó)際稅改協(xié)議仍未生效，歐洲五國(guó)的數(shù)字服務(wù)稅將繼續(xù)生效，而美國(guó)可實(shí)施報(bào)復(fù)性關(guān)稅措施。

新聞2.Turkey and US agree on phase-out of digital tax

（土耳其和美國(guó)同意逐步取消數(shù)字稅）

新聞來(lái)源：MNE Tax

時(shí)間：2021年11月23日

The US Treasury announced on November 22 that it hasreached an agreement with the Turkish government on Turkey’s transition fromits digital services tax to the new taxing rules under the OECD-led October 8international agreement.

The agreement adopts the same terms as those reachedby the US last month with Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK.

The terms allow Turkey’s digital taxes to stay inplace pending implementation of “Pillar One” of the OECD agreement, which wouldreallocate a portion of taxing rights to market jurisdictions. In addition, theagreement allows certain excess amounts paid in digital taxes in the interimperiod by in-scope companies to be creditable against future Pillar Oneliability.

In return for the coordinated withdrawal of Turkey’sdigital tax, the US agrees not to pursue retaliatory trade actions.

新聞3.India and US agree on transition from India’s ‘equalization levy’ digitaltax

（印度和美國(guó)同意從印度的“平等征稅”數(shù)字稅過(guò)渡）

新聞來(lái)源：MNE Tax

時(shí)間：2021年11月29日

The US and India have reached a compromise on atransition from India’s “equalization levy” digital services tax towards theterms of the October 8 multilateral agreement on new international taxingrules, according to a November 24 US Treasury announcement.

The announcement does not specify the terms of theagreement between the two countries but states that the “compromise representsa pragmatic solution” and that the countries “have committed to workingtogether through constructive dialogue on this matter.”

In accordance with this agreement, the US willterminate retaliatory trade measures threatened in response to India’sequalization levy.

The Indian government had introduced the equalizationlevy last year and announced proposed expansions earlier this year.

In June, the US had announced retaliatory tariffsagainst India and several other countries in response to their adoption ofdigital taxes, which the US deemed to be discriminatory against US companies.Imposition of the tariffs was suspended pending agreement on a multilateralsolution.

The US agreement with India with respect to phasingout its digital tax follows a similar November 22 agreement with Turkey and anearlier October 21 agreement with Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK.

新聞4.NZ Labour Partypromises digital services tax if international consensus not reached

（如果未達(dá)成國(guó)際共識(shí)，新西蘭工黨承諾征收數(shù)字服務(wù)稅）

新聞來(lái)源：TEEPWEEK

時(shí)間：2020年9月24日

The Labour Party, which is the larger of the twoparties in New Zealand's coalition government, has released its tax policyahead of the upcoming New Zealand general election to be held on October 172020. The aspect of the policy that has attracted the most attention fromvoters is a proposal to increase the top personal tax rate from 33% to 39%,with the new 39% rate applying to income over NZ$180,000 (US$120,000) perannum.

Of arguably greater significance to businesses,though, is the Party's policy on the taxation of multinational enterprises. TheParty has said it will "proactively work" with the OECD on "theissue of multinational corporations not paying their fair share of tax".However, if a multilateral solution cannot be found, the Party has said it"will work towards implementation of a digital services tax".

Design of a digital services tax

The Labour Party has not released details as to theform of a digital services tax (DST) except to say that the rate at which theDST applies would be set "once the international position is clear".It is reasonable to assume, though, that a unilateral DST would be based on theframework set out in the government discussion document: 'Options for taxingthe digital economy', which was released in June 2019.

In that discussion document, the government proposed aDST at the rate of 3% on the New Zealand proportion of a multinational group'sgross revenue from certain digital businesses, including intermediationplatforms, social media platforms, content sharing sites and search engines.The discussion document proposed that the DST would apply to businesses with aglobal consolidated annual turnover of at least €750m (US$887m), and annualrevenues attributable to New Zealand from activities within the scope of theDST of at least NZ$3.5m (US$2.3m).

The DST proposed in the discussion document wasprojected to raise between NZ$30m and NZ$80m (US$20m to US$54m) in taxannually. The government's total tax-take is over NZ$80b, meaning that even atthe top end of the range, a DST could be expected to represent no more than0.1% of the government's total tax-take.

Next steps

New Zealand has a mixed member proportional electoralsystem under which a political party's representation in parliament broadlyreflects the proportion of votes cast for that party nationally. Ordinarily, noone party secures an outright majority in parliament, meaning a major partywill usually require the support of one or more smaller parties to secure amajority and form a government.

The Green Party, who are a support partner of thecoalition government, proposes in its tax policy to close "loopholes andareas of under-taxation" for "digital giants". The Green Partyproposes either a unilateral DST of 3% on gross revenues attributable to NewZealand users, or a multilateral solution through the OECD "ifinternational progress can be achieved".

The leader of the largest of the opposition parties,the National Party, has recently acknowledged the challenge of applyingexisting tax rules to the digital economy, stating that “[s]ome of these bigmultinationals now are paying almost no tax anywhere, really, including NewZealand…".The National Party has, however, promised to introduce no newtaxes in its first term of government, if elected, and the party's leader hassuggested that it would be unlikely to implement a unilateral DST.

Commentators have expressed concern at the prospect ofNew Zealand implementing a unilateral DST. The DST is seen as problematic froma tax policy perspective: it is a tax on turnover rather than profit, it posesa high risk of double taxation since it is unlikely to be creditable againstincome tax, and it runs the risk of contravening New Zealand's obligations atinternational law (under double tax agreements or trade-related agreements).Moreover, other countries that have legislated, or even proposed, a unilateralDST have drawn the threat of retaliatory measures from the US.

With progress at OECD level looking uncertain, thereis a real prospect of the Labour Party, if it forms part of the governmentafter the election, proceeding to implement a unilateral DST. It is to be hopedthat the government would carefully consider the costs and risks ofimplementing a DST, in light of the relatively small amount of tax revenue aDST would raise.